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This monography provides an excellent synthesis of Roger Brownsword’s pio-
neering scholarship at the interface of bio-technologies and regulation over the
past decade (see, among many others, ‘What the World needs now: TechnoRegu-
lation, Human Rights, and Human Dignity’, in R. Brownsword [ed], Human Rights
[Oxford, Hart, 2004] 203; ‘Bioethics Today, Bioethics Tomorrow: Stem Cell Re-
search and the Dignitarian Alliance’ 17 University of Notre Dame Journal of Law,
Ethics & Public Policy 15, 2003; ‘Red Lights and Rogues: Regulating Human
Genetics’, in H. Somsen [ed], The Regulatory Challenge of BioTechnology [Chelten-
ham: Edward Elgar, 2007] 39). Although it is hardly in need of introduction in the
English-speaking world, the editors of this Review have thought it important that
attention should be drawn to this work, published in 2008, in continental
European private law circles, where the prevalence of legal formalism means
lesser familiarity with – and greater resistance to – the very concept of regulation
and the various strategies by means of which human behavior can be channeled,
including through the appropriate design of tools which may or may not be
recognizable as ‘law’. Moreover, for similar reasons, issues of political philosophy
rarely find their way through the mesh of legal technique, even in fields which
engage issues of democracy, human dignity or the status of scientific knowledge
to the extent that genetical engineering obviously does, particularly in a global
market of ever-available technology. In this remarkable book, Roger Brownsword
uses the lense of regulation to address the dilemma facing our complex societies
as articulated by Habermas (The Future of Human Nature [Cambridge, Polity
Press, 2003] 92): should normative foundations be dropped, in favour of bioge-
netic steering mechanisms?
In terms of ideal regulatory regimes, standard (public or private) law defi-
nitely fits an ‘East coast’ rather than a ‘West coast’ model (see 13). The former,
which largely corresponds to the rule-of-law tradition, rests upon the principle
that regulation engages with the practical reason of the regulatees, who will
consent as a community to the various restrictions and controls they may suffer
individually, in the light of various legitimizing arguments articulated as the
public interest. On the other hand, the ‘West coast’ model – presented as an
Orwellian thought experiment, with a realistic prospect of becoming reality in
view of the astounding growth of nanotechnologies, neuroscience, biometrics –
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uses the resources of a ‘designed environment’, in which patterns of human
conduct are induced directly by architecture or technology, by-passing the com-
mands and conditions of the law. While the point made here is – easier said than
done – that optimal regulation would make use of the full range of available
regulatory strategies from East to West, the distinction between the two ideal
regulatory modes serves importantly to explain the plan of the book, which in turn
emphasizes Roger Brownsword’s own, highly original, contribution to the bio-
technologies debate.
Thus, the book first explores the various challenges raised by bio-technolo-
gies as targets of regulation: the ‘East coast’ regulator will be called to account
essentially in terms of moral or ethical legitimacy of purpose and means of
regulation, but also in the light of the effectiveness of regulatory measures, their
connectedness (to the target of regulation), and their responsiveness to the
demands of cosmopolitanism, where different regulatory policies and strategies
may conflict over issues such as market access in various supra or transnational
sites or fora. However, the book then goes on to consider the prospect that direct
recourse to technological design will be used increasingly, under a ‘West coast’
regulatory approach, to steer behavior in the place of more traditional legal tools
(whether these be command-and-control legislation, or other more contemporary
participative normativities). It seeks therefore to brings out the ‘West coast’
regulatory potential of the very technologies – beginning with databases – that
are the targets of ‘East coast’ regulation, considered here, excitingly, as ‘regula-
tory opportunity’.
But of course, the complex challenges already identified as facing the East
coast regulator, notably in the form of legitimacy requirements, reappear inexor-
ably on the West coast, and go to the very feasibility of a regulatory mix. In other
words, how can the East coast regulator take advantage of technological steering
devices without sacrificing the moral community on which the (East coast) rule-
of-law model rests? As Roger Brownsword puts it (262), ‘…once East-coast regula-
tors start to head West, is there any stopping point short of the West coast itself’?
There follows (Chapter 10: Code and the Corrosion of Moral Community) a
fascinating thought experiment, in which two proposals for regulatory hybridity
are examined. The first, predominantly East coast project limits assistance from
technology to detect non-compliance, identify offenders and bring them before
the courts. In this scheme, at least in theory, the offender remains free to choose
a life of crime, even if she has a criminal record or shows some sort of criminal
predisposition, but the court system will be able to carry out its traditional task of
punishment more effectively. However, even so restricted, panopticon surveil-
lance technologies may actually remove any realistic margin for free choice,
which the East-coast model promotes as a foundational virtue. If detection is
certain, will regulatees really be encouraged do the right thing for the right
reason, or merely from fear of punishment, with the correlative loss of learning
capacity?
This objection of course reappears against the second proposal, which allows
technology to design-out unacceptable conduct ex ante – for example, by remov-
ing predisposition towards (the most threatening forms of) violence through
genetical engineering. The regulatory priority here is to secure an environment in
which each member of the community may pursue and fulfill her life project
freely, without interference in, or from, others. At the heart of the model lies
support for agency or self-regulation – the moral requirement of the opportunity
for self-fulfillment is to act in fellow-agent-respecting ways. However, under this
proposal, the possibility of free choice – choosing to do the right thing, for the
right reason – is once again clearly diminished, or, rather, relegated to the (grey)
zone of less threatening offenses. The whole context of wrongdoing is thereby
fundamentally altered. Now, the virtue of doing the right thing may have a value
that lies deeper than the purely instrumental purpose of allowing the flowering of
individual and co-operative life projects, which can be obtained through techno-
logical design. Perhaps doing the right thing speaks more profoundly to what it is
to be human? In another vocabulary, perhaps it is irrational for an agent to deny
being bound by other-regarding principles?
The quest for a regulatory hybrid appears therefore to lead to stale-mate:
‘There is no obvious mid-West regulatory model’ (272). This is because the
essential divide between the two follows the inclusiveness of regulatory dialogue.
The West coast model supposes a divided community, in which a regulatory elite
design-in the behavioural patterns to which the regulatees have no choice but to
conform. The East coast model, in the other hand, allows dialogue between
regulators and regulatees through participatory democracy and moral commu-
nity. While West coast regulatees could of course claim inclusion in the regulatory
processes, there is no way that regulators could open their moral deliberation
without taking a step back to the East coast. Does this mean that the East coast
model, which rests on the dignitarian argument that human is to be able to do the
right thing for the right reason, have more going for it than all the technologically
sophisticated West coast regulatory opportunities? While its dignitarian commit-
ment, seen as a pre-condition to moral community, can easily navigate the
possible hurdle of human rights (as articulated by a certain ‘South coast conser-
vatism’: does commitment to human dignity necessarily condemn a whole raft of
practices and pursuits, such as sad-masochism? Of course not…), it may have
more trouble with the far rockier philosophical territory of free will. If human
genetics, neuroscience, or indeed psychoanalysis, demonstrate that there is no
such thing as a free choice, the East coast model is in serious danger of flounder-
ing entirely. Indeed (280), ‘what would it take for brain science to close the doors
on moral community’?
At the end of the book, we are left with this carefully explored uncertainty,
but above all, with a bright line of which we should on no account lose sight. If
indeed future regulators were to decide that ‘what the world needs now is hi-tech
social control’, it must always be remembered that neither regulatory effective-
ness nor even informed regulatee consent are enough to ensure compatibility of
regulatory modes with a moral community of rights. ‘The fundamental question is
whether technology threatens to change the cultural environment in a way that
no aspirant moral community can live with’ (316). If so, a sort of regulator’s
precautionary principle commands to go no further in the use of bio and neuro-
technologies. Clearly, our ‘posthuman future’ still requires a massive research
agenda. We read, with relief and admiration, that Roger Brownword’s ‘underlying
project is only just underway’!
